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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2002, in the landmark case of Atkins v. Virginia,1 the Supreme 
Court of the United States held, in a 6-3 majority, that the execution of a 
defendant with mental retardation was considered to be a violation of the 
Eighth Amendment.2  The Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual 
punishment, which led to the Court’s ruling that the execution of a defendant 
with an intellectual disability was unconstitutional.3  In order to make this 
decision, the Court had to determine how to differentiate between a 
defendant with normal intellectual functioning and one with a significant 
intellectual disability.4  The Court utilized a few psychological resources, 
including the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (“DSM” 
or “Manual”) IV-TR, to determine what criterion was necessary to qualify a 
person as having mental retardation.5  By citing the definition of mental 
retardation from the DSM in their decision, the Court acknowledged that the 
Manual has an important legal use;6 this would later influence many states to 
use it in the creation of their own legislation.7 
In May of 2013, a fifth edition of the DSM was released.8  In this 
new edition, several revisions were made to mental retardation that are 
different from the information provided in the DSM-IV-TR, which was the 
current edition during the Atkins decision.9  The changes made include a 
name change from mental retardation to intellectual disability, as well as a 
change in the criterion used to make a clinical diagnosis.10  The diagnostic 
                                            
1. 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
2. Richard J. Bonnie & Katherine Gustafson, The Challenge of Implementing 
Atkins v. Virginia:  How Legislatures and Courts Can Promote Accurate Assessments and 
Adjudications of Mental Retardation in Death Penalty Cases, 41 U. RICH. L. REV. 811, 812 
(2007); Joanna Hall, Comment, Atkins v. Virginia:  National Consensus or Six-Person 
Opinion?, 12 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 361, 362 (2004). 
3. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; Hall, supra note 2, at 362. 
4. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308–09. 
5. See id. at 308 n.3; see also AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-IV-TR:  
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS xxix, 41 (4th ed., text rev. 
2000) [hereinafter AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-IV-TR]. 
6. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308 n.3. 
7. Benjamin J. Clark, Comment, America’s Evolving Stance on Mental 
Retardation and the Death Penalty, 7 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 121, 137 (2003). 
8. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5:  DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL 
OF MENTAL DISORDERS (5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5]; 
Timeline, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, http://www.dsm5.org/about/pages/timeline.aspx (last 
visited Feb. 16, 2014). 
9. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308 n.3; AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5, supra 
note 8, at 33; Intellectual Disability, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, http://www.dsm5.org/
Documents/Intellectual%20Disability%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 2014). 
10. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5, supra note 8, at 33. 
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criteria in the new edition moves away from the prior focus on the 
Intelligence Quotient (“IQ”) score—an objective standard—to a 
concentration on a measure of the person’s adaptive functioning, which is a 
more subjective measure.11  These changes, which create a greater overall 
subjective standard for a diagnosis of intellectual disability, differ from those 
in place when the Atkins decision was made.12 
With the newly released DSM-5 starting to be used by mental health 
professionals, the definition in operation for intellectual disability will now 
be different from that in place when the Atkins case was decided;13 this 
change will inevitably have an impact in the legal field for criminal cases 
with defendants that have intellectual disabilities.14  This article will first 
discuss the facts of the Atkins case, as well as background information about 
mental retardation and the death penalty, the DSM, and the specific 
diagnostic standards for mental retardation that were current at the time of 
the Atkins decision.15  This section will provide the history and details of the 
Atkins case, as well as an explanation of the final holding of the Court.16  The 
third section will note the relevant revisions made in the DSM-5 with the 
shift from mental retardation to intellectual disability.17  The final section 
will analyze the differences between the DSM-IV-TR and the DSM-5.18  
This discussion will be an attempt to predict the inevitable impact that the 
changes in the new edition of DSM will have on the legal system when 
courts are presented with mentally retarded defendants that face capital 
punishment; the diagnostic criteria used by professionals to assess the patient 
and determine a diagnosis will no longer match up with the law in most 
states.19  Additionally, the final section will hypothesize solutions to the 
problems that may be created by the revisions.20 
                                            
11. Id.; Intellectual Disability, supra note 9. 
12. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308–09; AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5, supra 
note 8, at 33. 
13. See infra Part III. 
14. See infra Part IV. 
15. See infra Part II. 
16. See infra Part II. 
17. See infra Part III. 
18. See infra Part IV. 
19. See infra Part IV. 
20. See infra Part IV.A. 
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II. MENTAL RETARDATION AND THE DEATH PENALTY 
The history of mental retardation and the death penalty is a relatively 
simple and straightforward one.21  Evidence of the relationship between the 
two can be seen dating back as early as the late 1700s when a person that 
was deemed by the court to be an idiot “was not subject to criminal 
liability.”22  By today’s standards, an idiot would be a person with severe or 
profound mental retardation.23  More recently, the Supreme Court of the 
United States heard the case of Godfrey v. Georgia24 in 1980.25  In this case, 
the Court “discussed the necessity of finding that a defendant has [a] higher 
moral culpability than an average criminal in order for the death penalty to 
be imposed.”26  The holding of this case will prove to be particularly 
important for future defendants with mental impairments when capital 
punishment is under consideration; their level of culpability is a factor that 
will be assessed by the courts as a determination of whether this punishment 
is appropriate.27 
Nine years later, the Supreme Court of the United States granted 
certiorari and heard the case of Penry v. Lynaugh28 in 1989; this was the first 
time the Court would address the issue of execution of a mentally retarded 
defendant.29  In this case, Johnny Paul Penry was sentenced to death after he 
confessed to the rape and murder of Pamela Carpenter.30  In state court, a 
clinical psychologist testified that Penry had mild to moderate mental 
retardation and an IQ score between fifty and sixty-three.31  Despite this, the 
jury found Penry competent to stand trial.32  The result of the trial was that 
“[t]he jury rejected Penry’s insanity defense and found him guilty of capital 
murder.”33 
                                            
21. See James W. Ellis, Disability Advocacy and the Death Penalty:  The 
Road from Penry to Atkins, 33 N.M. L. REV. 173, 173 (2003). 
22. Lyn Entzeroth, Constitutional Prohibition on the Execution of the 
Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendant, 38 TULSA L. REV. 299, 307 (2002). 
23. Id. at 308. 
24. 446 U.S. 420 (1980). 
25. Id. at 420. 
26. Änna M. Hagstrom, Atkins v. Virginia:  An Empty Holding Devoid of 
Justice for the Mentally Retarded, 27 LAW & INEQ. 241, 248 (2009). 
27. See Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 43233; Hagstrom, supra note 26, at 248. 
28. 492 U.S. 302 (1989), abrogated by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 
(2002). 
29. Ellis, supra note 21, at 174. 
30. Penry, 492 U.S. at 307. 
31. Id. at 307–08. 
32. Id. at 308. 
33. Id. at 310. 
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In granting certiorari, the Supreme Court of the United States 
specifically addressed the question of whether “it [is] cruel and unusual 
punishment under the Eighth Amendment to execute a mentally retarded 
person.”34  The result of this case was that the Court failed to find an Eighth 
Amendment violation and stated that mental retardation should be viewed 
only as a mitigating factor when considering sentencing.35  The Court also 
stated that “[w]hile a national consensus against [the] execution of the 
mentally retarded may someday emerge . . . there is insufficient evidence of 
such a consensus today.”36  Despite the holding, after the Penry decision, 
eighteen states enacted legislation granting categorical exemption to any 
mentally retarded defendant from the death penalty.37 
A. A Brief History of the Death Penalty 
Prior to Penry, in 1972, the Supreme Court of the United States 
heard the case of Furman v. Georgia38 and held that in its current use, the 
death penalty—also referred to as capital punishment—violated the Eighth 
Amendment.39  In this case, three black men had each been accused of the 
rape or murder of a woman and for this, they faced the death penalty.40  The 
Eighth Amendment “bans the use of cruel and unusual punishment.”41  
Specifically, the Eighth Amendment reads, “[e]xcessive bail shall not be 
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments 
inflicted.”42  In writing this amendment, the Framers of the Constitution were 
aiming to prevent methods of punishment that would be equivalent to 
torture.43  In their decision, the Supreme Court Justices had different 
opinions and reasoning behind their choice of whether or not the death 
penalty was unconstitutional per se, but did agree on the final holding that 
the death penalty in its current form was cruel and unusual punishment.44 
However, in 1976, the Supreme Court of the United States heard the 
case that established the death penalty could be reinstated and was not 
                                            
34. Id. at 313. 
35. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; Penry, 492 U.S. at 340. 
36. Penry, 492 U.S. at 340 (emphasis added). 
37. Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 2, at 812. 
38. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam). 
39. Id. at 239–40; Amanda M. Raines, Note, Prohibiting the Execution of the 
Mentally Retarded, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 171, 177–78 (2002). 
40. Furman, 408 U.S. at 239, 252–53 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
41. Raines, supra note 39, at 177. 
42. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
43. Raines, supra note 39, at 177. 
44. Furman, 408 U.S. at 239–40; Raines, supra note 39, at 178. 
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entirely unconstitutional.45  Gregg v. Georgia46 presented a case in which the 
defendant committed armed robbery and murder; he sought to challenge the 
constitutionality of his death sentence.47  The Court held that, as a penalty for 
murder, the death penalty does not violate the Eighth Amendment.48  “[T]he 
goals of retribution and deterrence of capital crimes may be permissible” as 
factors to be considered when making the determination of “‘whether the 
death penalty should [or should not] be imposed.’”49  Simply put, to satisfy 
the goal of retribution, the Court must determine if the crime committed is 
serious enough to deserve the punishment.50  To make this determination, it 
is important to note, “the punishment of death is sufficiently related to an 
individual’s personal culpability.”51  Essentially, the levels of culpability of 
the offender and severity of the punishment must match.52  The theory of 
deterrence is based upon the idea that punishment would inhibit a criminal 
from engaging in that particular behavior; capital punishment can only be 
considered a deterrent if the murder is premeditated and deliberate.53  The 
reason behind that is the cause and effect relationship between the crime and 
the punishment.54  In making its decision, the Court noted that the 
punishment of death could not be said to be disproportionate to the crime of 
murder, in which another life is intentionally taken.55  Despite this holding, 
opponents to the death penalty still believe that it should be abolished 
completely for all offenders.56 
                                            
45. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976); Kelly Christine Elmore, 
Note, Atkins v. Virginia:  Death Penalty for the Mentally Retarded—Cruel and Unusual—the 
Crime, Not the Punishment, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1285, 1295 (2004). 
46. 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
47. Id. at 158, 162. 
48. Id. at 207; Elmore, supra note 45, at 1295. 
49. Holly T. Sharp, Determining Mental Retardation in Capital Defendants:  
Using a Strict IQ Cut-Off Number Will Allow the Execution of Many That Atkins Intended to 
Spare, 12 JONES L. REV. 227, 229–30 (2008); see also Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183. 
50. J. Amy Dillard, And Death Shall Have No Dominion:  How to Achieve the 
Categorical Exemption of Mentally Retarded Defendants from Execution, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 
961, 970 (2011). 
51. Hall, supra note 2, at 376. 
52. Hagstrom, supra note 26, at 247. 
53. Hall, supra note 2, at 377. 
54. Hagstrom, supra note 26, at 247. 
55. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976). 
56. Sharp, supra note 49, at 232. 
6
Nova Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 6
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol38/iss2/6
2014] EFFECT OF THE DSM-5 ON POST-ATKINS 329 
B. The Atkins Case 
In 2002, the Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari in 
the case of Atkins v. Virginia, a criminal case of murder from 1996.57  In this 
case, the defendant, Daryl Renard Atkins, was convicted of abducting Eric 
Nesbitt, robbing him of the money that he had with him, as well as forcing 
him to make a cash withdrawal from an automated teller machine.58  That 
evening, William Jones was also present and participated in the abduction 
and robbery.59  Later on, Atkins and Jones, who had both been armed with 
semiautomatic handguns the entire time, took Nesbitt to a remote location to 
shoot him eight times, which resulted in his death.60 
“Initially, both Jones and Atkins were indicted [under a] capital 
murder” charge for what happened to Nesbitt.61  However, Jones made a deal 
to plead guilty to first-degree murder in return for a full testimony against 
Atkins; this gave him the sentence of life imprisonment and made it no 
longer possible for him to receive the death penalty.62  During Atkins’ trial, 
his and Jones’ stories matched up substantially with the exception as to who 
actually took the shots resulting in Nesbitt’s death.63  As Jones did not have 
any sort of mental deficiency, his testimony was clearer and seemingly more 
credible to the jury than that of Atkins; Jones’ clear testimony provided the 
jury with sufficient evidence of Atkins’ guilt.64 
In the penalty phase of the trial, Dr. Evan Nelson, a forensic 
psychologist, testified for the defense about his pre-trial evaluation of 
Atkins.65  Taking into consideration “interviews with people who knew 
Atkins, a review of school and court records, and the administration of a 
standard intelligence test which indicated that Atkins had a full scale IQ of 
[fifty-nine],” Dr. Nelson stated that Atkins was mildly mentally retarded and 
had been consistently throughout his life.66  Despite this finding provided by 
Dr. Nelson, the jury sentenced Atkins to death.67  After a second sentencing 
hearing due to a misleading verdict form, the jury rendered the same 
verdict.68  With influence from the dramatic shift made in state legislation in 
                                            
57. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 307 (2002). 
58. Id. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. at 307 n.1. 
62. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 307 n.1. 
63. Id. at 307. 
64. See id. 
65. Id. at 308. 
66. Id. at 308–09. 
67. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 309. 
68. Id. 
7
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favor of protecting mentally retarded defendants that had occurred since the 
Penry decision, as well as the severe opinion of the dissenters, the Supreme 
Court of the United States granted certiorari as that someday mentioned in 
the Penry decision had finally arrived, and it was time to review the 
relationship between mentally retarded criminal offenders and the death 
penalty.69 
C. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
While reviewing the facts of the case in order to reach a decision, the 
Court used two similar psychological definitions to clearly understand Dr. 
Nelson’s diagnosis that Atkins was mildly mentally retarded.70  While 
multiple sources for a definition exist, the Court chose to use the DSM-IV-
TR and the similar definition of the American Association of Mental 
Retardation (“AAMR”).71  These definitions may differ in language, but 
offer the same conceptual information as to how to reach a diagnosis.72  
Specifically, the DSM is a diagnostic manual created by the American 
Psychiatric Association that classifies each type of mental disorder and 
provides diagnostic criteria to be used for a diagnosis.73  The DSM is 
particularly important, as it is the manual used by mental health professionals 
to make a diagnosis for a patient.74  Psychologists and psychiatrists—and 
their work—are important in the legal arena, as they serve as expert 
witnesses in cases where the defendant’s mental health is called into 
question.75 
In the United States, the DSM is the primary tool used for mental 
health professionals to make their diagnoses.76  The DSM uses a multiaxial 
system, which assesses an individual on five different axes.77  These axes 
each refer to a different area of information about that person, which helps 
the clinician in creating a comprehensive evaluation of the person.78  This 
system also contributes to a convenient format that allows the universal 
                                            
69. Id. at 307; Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 340 (1989), abrogated by 
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
70. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308 & n.3. 
71. Id. at 308 n.3. 
72. Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 2, at 819. 
73. John A. Zervopoulos, The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM):  An Overview, in 2 EXPERT WITNESS MANUAL 1, 3 (1999); AM. 
PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-IV-TR, supra note 5, at xxiii. 
74. Zervopoulos, supra note 73, at 3. 
75. See id. at 2. 
76. Id. at 3. 
77. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-IV-TR, supra note 5, at 27. 
78. Id. 
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understanding of the diagnosis.79  In addition to diagnosis, the DSM also 
serves as a tool to develop treatment plans and anticipate treatment 
outcomes.80  DSM is so widely accepted that it is also used by the insurance 
industry to determine appropriate reimbursements for psychological 
treatments.81 
As noted, psychologists and psychiatrists use the DSM in their 
clinical practices to make diagnoses and can serve as expert witnesses in 
death penalty cases involving potentially mentally retarded defendants.82  
The expert must assess the defendant as they would if the defendant 
individually sought their help in a private practice.83  Diagnosis is 
particularly important for a mental health professional serving as an expert in 
a capital case as their diagnosis will be determinative of the defendant’s fate; 
it is a life or death determination.84  While it may not be a perfect forensic 
tool and was not specifically designed for legal use,85 due to its importance 
and overwhelming use in the mental health field, the Court chose to refer to 
the DSM for information about the psychiatric diagnosis of mental 
retardation.86  It has continued to be heavily relied upon for legal 
determinations that involve some sort of mental impairment or dysfunction.87 
DSM-IV-TR, the edition reviewed by the Supreme Court of the 
United States in Atkins, does include a section in the introduction that 
cautions about forensic usage of the Manual.88  It states “dangers arise 
because of the imperfect fit between the questions of ultimate concern to the 
law and the information contained in a clinical diagnosis.”89  It could be 
argued that this warning is suggesting that mental health professionals should 
limit their conduct to their own field of expertise as the DSM is intended for 
                                            
79. Id. 
80. Zervopoulos, supra note 73, at 4. 
81. Id. 
82. John Matthew Fabian et al., Life, Death, and IQ:  It’s Much More than 
Just a Score:  Understanding and Utilizing Forensic Psychological and Neuropsychological 
Evaluations in Atkins Intellectual Disability/Mental Retardation Cases, 59 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 
399, 403 (2011). 
83. See id. 
84. Id. 
85. See Hagstrom, supra note 26, at 265. 
86. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 308 n.3 (2002). 
87. Douglas A. Hass, Could the American Psychiatric Association Cause You 
Headaches?  The Dangerous Interaction Between the DSM-5 and Employment Law, 44 LOY. 
U. CHI. L.J. 683, 692 (2013). 
88. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308 n.3; AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-IV-TR, supra 
note 5, at xxxii–xxxiii. 
89. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-IV-TR, supra note 5, at xxxiii. 
9
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use of diagnosis in the mental health field and not for legal determinations.90  
The addition of legal information into the DSM would prove to be more 
problematic than helpful, which is why forensic additions have not been 
included in new editions of the Manual.91  However, it is noted in the DSM 
that with proper awareness of the risks and limitations, the DSM should 
properly assist legal decision-makers in reaching their final conclusion.92 
Despite the brief textual warning in the introduction that the DSM 
should not be used for forensic purposes, as information may be 
misrepresented, it is frequently used when law and psychology or psychiatry 
intersect.93  “Courts, legislators, and government[al] agencies have relied on 
the DSM[] as a persuasive” tool when making decisions in cases that involve 
mental illness.94  For example, some state and federal statutes make use of 
DSM definitions of mental illness or diagnostic criteria.95  Some states make 
specific mention of the DSM while others just use the language found in it.96  
The DSM is cited over 5500 times in court opinions, including other death 
penalty cases.97  Courts have also referred to the DSM with the use of highly 
respectful terms in several decisions.98  It is clear that the DSM has played an 
important role in the legal world—through the development of legislation 
and decisions made in the courtroom—and it will continue to do so.99 
1. Mental Retardation 
As stated, the edition of the DSM that was current and in use during 
Atkins was the DSM-IV-TR, which is a textual revision of the fourth 
edition.100  According to the DSM-IV-TR, mental retardation “is 
characterized by significantly subaverage intellectual functioning—an IQ of 
approximately [seventy] or below—with onset before age [eighteen] years 
                                            
90. Id.; Daniel W. Shuman, The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders in the Courts, 17 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 25, 26 (1989). 
91. See Shuman, supra note 90, at 26–27; Ralph Slovenko, Editorial, The 
DSM in Litigation and Legislation, 39 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 6, 6 (2011). 
92. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-IV-TR, supra note 5, at xxxiii. 
93. Slovenko, supra note 91, at 6. 
94. Hass, supra note 87, at 692. 
95. Cia Bearden, Comment, The Reality of the DSM in the Legal Arena:  A 
Proposition for Curtailing Undesired Consequences of an Imperfect Tool, 13 HOUS. J. 
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 79, 80 (2012). 
96. Id. at 97–98. 
97. Slovenko, supra note 91, at 6, 8. 
98. Hass, supra note 87, at 692. 
99. See Slovenko, supra note 91, at 11. 
100. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 308 n.3 (2002); AM. PSYCHIATRIC 
ASS’N, DSM-IV-TR, supra note 5, at xxix. 
10
Nova Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 6
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol38/iss2/6
2014] EFFECT OF THE DSM-5 ON POST-ATKINS 333 
and concurrent deficits or impairments in adaptive functioning.”101  At the 
time of publication, the prevalence rate of mental retardation was estimated 
to be one percent of the population.102  The estimated number of incarcerated 
offenders is two percent to twenty-five percent.103  Between four percent and 
twenty percent of the offenders currently on death row are estimated to be 
mentally retarded; of the three thousand five hundred, this comes out to 
about one hundred forty to seven hundred people.104  This is a significant 
number of people, which stresses why diagnosis is so important and will 
impact the implementation of the Atkins holding; it could result in pardons 
from the death penalty.105 
The DSM-IV-TR defines the diagnostic features of mental 
retardation as including three necessary criterions.106 
The essential feature of Mental Retardation is significantly 
subaverage general intellectual functioning (Criterion A) that is 
accompanied by significant limitations in adaptive functioning in 
at least two of the following skill areas:  [C]ommunication, self-
care, home living, social/interpersonal skills, use of community 
resources, self-direction, functional academic skills, work, leisure, 
health, and safety (Criterion B).  The onset must occur before age 
[eighteen] years (Criterion C).107 
Each of the three diagnostic criterions is equally as important; all are 
necessary for a person to receive a diagnosis of mental retardation and one 
cannot be omitted.108  For example, even if an individual has an IQ score 
lower than seventy, a diagnosis cannot be made if there is no impairment in 
adaptive functioning.109  Per Criterion B, adaptive functioning is defined as 
“how effectively individuals cope with common life demands and how well 
they meet the standards of personal independence expected of someone in 
their particular age group, sociocultural background, and community 
setting.”110  This serves as a protection to ensure that the person is not just a 
                                            
101. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-IV-TR, supra note 5, at 39. 
102. Id. at 46. 
103. Peggy M. Tobolowsky, Atkins Aftermath:  Identifying Mentally Retarded 
Offenders and Excluding Them from Execution, 30 J. LEGIS. 77, 86 (2003–2004). 
104. Id. 
105. Id. at 85–86. 
106. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-IV-TR, supra note 5, at 41. 
107. Id. 
108. See id. at 41–42, 47. 
109. Id. at 42. 
110. Id. 
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bad test-taker.111  Adaptive functioning includes “self-direction, functioning 
academic skills, work, leisure, health, safety, personal hygiene, self-control, 
and aspects of unmanageable behavior” which are each taken into account 
when a determination for adaptive functioning is made.112  Any third-party 
contacts need to be carefully and thoroughly questioned about the individual 
in order for an accurate evaluation of adaptive functioning to be made.113  
Assessments do exist, but this type of determination is not one that is easily 
assessed by a standardized test.114 
The third and final prong, that is equally as important for diagnosis, 
is that mental retardation exists and will present itself in childhood.115  
Criterion C sets the specification that the person must show signs of 
cognitive impairment before the age of eighteen.116  What this means is that a 
person with seemingly normal cognitive function cannot unexpectedly 
become mentally retarded as an adult.117  This criterion is also in place to 
help clinicians with differential diagnosis; this allows them to distinguish 
between mental retardation and other intellectual deficits that can be 
acquired later in life due to a dramatic change such as brain trauma or 
disease.118  Additionally, while a mentally retarded person can be taught 
certain skills that can help them function in society in a more normal way, 
they can never be fully cured with therapy; this is a chronic condition.119  
When Criterion C is evaluated along with the first two criterions, if a 
diagnosis of mental retardation is made, it can be sure that it is one that 
would reflect the person as a whole including their psychosocial and 
cognitive functioning.120 
A diagnosis of mental retardation is further divided into four varying 
degrees of severity:  Mild, moderate, severe, and profound.121  The degree of 
severity that is most questioned in a legal setting, particularly in Atkins cases, 
is the lowest level—mild mental retardation—which is defined as having an 
                                            
111. JAMES R. EISENBERG, LAW, PSYCHOLOGY, AND DEATH PENALTY 
LITIGATION 113 (2004). 
112. Id. at 113–14. 
113. Id. at 113. 
114. See id.; Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 2, at 846–47. 
115. Raines, supra note 39, at 176. 
116. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-IV-TR, supra note 5, at 41. 
117. Raines, supra note 39, at 176. 
118. Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 2, at 854. 
119. Raines, supra note 39, at 176. 
120. EISENBERG, supra note 111, at 114; AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-IV-
TR, supra note 5, at 41. 
121. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-IV-TR, supra note 5, at 39. 
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“IQ level [fifty to fifty-five] to approximately [seventy].”122  Why is that?  It 
is because this group is the closest or borderline to the level of normal 
cognitive functioning.123  This group, mild mental retardation, is the largest 
group consisting of approximately eighty-five percent of those who have 
mental retardation.124  They are described as having the “social and 
vocational skills adequate for minimum self-support.”125  Those with this low 
degree of severity should live successfully in a community setting either on 
their own or under supervision.126 
2. Intelligence Quotient 
For Criterion A of a mental retardation diagnosis, general intellectual 
functioning is measured and classified by an IQ score.127  In order to assess 
subaverage intellectual functioning, it is necessary to implement an 
intelligence test.128  Several IQ tests exist and are used in psychometric 
testing, so a single individual may have multiple true IQ scores based upon 
their performance on each test they have taken.129  The standard and most 
frequently used tests are the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Test, 3rd edition 
(“WAIS-III”) and the Standford-Binet.130  These assessments are designed to 
measure a person’s general intelligence score by assessing a broad range of 
skills that produce a final numerical score that correlates to his or her level of 
mental functioning.131 
This score, as it is assessed through the psychometric measures, is an 
objective measure of a person’s cognitive performance.132  The person’s raw 
                                            
122. Id. at 42; see Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 2, at 825; Frank M. 
Gresham, Interpretation of Intelligence Test Scores in Atkins Cases:  Conceptual and 
Psychometric Issues, 16 APPLIED NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 91, 92 (2009). 
123. See Tobolowsky, supra note 103, at 88. 
124. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-IV-TR, supra note 5, at 43. 
125. Id. 
126. Id. 
127. Id. at 41. 
128. David L. Rumley, Comment, A License to Kill:  The Categorical 
Exemption of the Mentally Retarded from the Death Penalty, 24 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1299, 1315–
17 (1993); Sharp, supra note 49, at 231. 
129. Gresham, supra note 122, at 93. 
130. Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 2, at 826; Alexis Krulish Dowling, 
Comment, Post-Atkins Problems with Enforcing the Supreme Court’s Ban on Executing the 
Mentally Retarded, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 773, 798 (2003); Penny J. White, Symposium, 
Treated Differently in Life But Not in Death:  The Execution of the Intellectually Disabled 
After Atkins v. Virginia, 76 TENN. L. REV. 685, 692 (2009). 
131. Dowling, supra note 130, at 798; see also White, supra note 130, at 692–
93. 
132. See Tobolowsky, supra note 103, at 95. 
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score is compared to a norm that is predetermined to reach his or her result 
IQ score.133  It is important for the courts to be vigilant as to which test was 
administered to the defendant and how that particular test is to be interpreted, 
as norms for each assessment differ.134  The result—the IQ score—and the 
person’s performance on these tests are interpreted to determine if a 
defendant has a mental deficiency and, if so, what degree of mental 
retardation.135  In general, an IQ score of seventy or below must be obtained 
in order to receive a diagnosis of mental retardation; the score serves as an 
essential component in the defendant’s diagnosis.136  This score of seventy is 
“two standard deviations below the mean” score of one hundred.137  
However, it should be noted that in IQ assessment, “there is a measurement 
error of approximately [five] points” depending on the testing instrument 
used; due to this, mental retardation can also be found in individuals with IQ 
scores from seventy to seventy-five that show the appropriate level of 
adaptive behavior.138 
a. Potential Issues with IQ Scores 
The IQ test, while it appears to be a convenient and relatively simple 
tool, is deceiving, as it has been found to have flaws.139  In fact, it is often 
referred to as an imperfect tool.140  There can be a discrepancy between what 
the court believes an intelligence test measures and what it actually does 
measure; the court and legal professionals are not trained in the 
comprehension of psychometric measures.141  While these potential issues 
are important to consider, reliance on the IQ score remains high, as it 
remains heavily used and relied upon.142 
One believed flaw of IQ tests is the Flynn Effect—the general 
upward trend of IQ scores—which causes a need for the test norms to be 
updated and recalculated so that the score can continue to provide an 
accurate reflection of the actual IQ.143  James Flynn states that the mean IQ 
                                            
133. Dowling, supra note 130, at 798–99; Fabian et al., supra note 82, at 414; 
see also Gresham, supra note 122, at 93. 
134. Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 2, at 825. 
135. See Gresham, supra note 122, at 92. 
136. Clark, supra note 7, at 137; Rumley, supra note 128, at 1317. 
137. Sharp, supra note 49 at 231. 
138. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-IV-TR, supra note 5, at 41–42. 
139. Rumley, supra note 128, at 1329. 
140. Id. at 1333–34. 
141. See Gresham, supra note 122, at 96. 
142. Tobolowsky, supra note 103, at 95. 
143. Gresham, supra note 122, at 93. 
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of Americans increases three points per decade and 0.3 points per year.144  
Flynn also believes that intelligence of a single individual does not change, 
but the norm changes over time; it could be said that the Flynn Effect has no 
impact on death penalty cases as it only concerns norms.145  However, the 
problem arises when the IQ assessment used produces scores that rely 
entirely on comparison to the norms for their meaning.146  It has also been 
found that individuals may score differently on an intelligence test depending 
on which point in the norming cycle the person took the assessment.147  For 
example, a person’s performance may result in a score in the mentally 
retarded range in the beginning of the cycle of a certain assessment and in a 
more borderline range at the end of the cycle of that same assessment.148 
The other important discrepancy with IQ assessment scores is 
practice effects, which is the theory that those with cognitive dysfunction are 
often administered multiple tests throughout their lifetime and that causes 
inflated IQ scores.149  Due to this, it is known that practice effects occur, and 
scores can increase due to the repeated administration of the measures; a 
useful rule of thumb is to only use each assessment once a year with an 
individual to reduce this effect.150  It is important to note that the smaller the 
time interval between administrations of the test, the larger the practice effect 
can be.151  The specific outcome of practice effects can also vary; factors that 
can alter the performance include “the person’s age, their learning ability and 
the time interval between testing.”152  This effect becomes problematic when 
a person shows an overall increase in their IQ score, but continues to display 
the same deficits in their adaptive functioning.153 
Additionally, race and socioeconomic background have also been 
found to alter an individual’s IQ score.154  Another possible influence on IQ 
score is that a defendant may be able to fake their mental retardation by 
purposely doing poorly on an IQ test; the faking of a mental illness is known 
as malingering.155  However, even if attempted, the faking of a low IQ score 
is difficult to do, and the IQ score is not the only consideration in a 
                                            
144. Id. 
145. Id. at 94. 
146. Id. 
147. EISENBERG, supra note 111, at 113. 
148. Id. 
149. Gresham, supra note 122, at 94–95. 
150. Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 2, at 839; Gresham, supra note 122, at 
95. 
151. Gresham, supra note 122, at 95. 
152. Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 2, at 839. 
153. Id. at 840. 
154. Sharp, supra note 49, at 243. 
155. Id. at 245. 
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diagnosis.156  Despite the possibility that there may be some flaws in the IQ 
testing system, the IQ score has remained an important factor in determining 
the intellectual functioning of a person under the diagnostic criteria DSM-IV 
as it is a more objective measure used by the mental health professional to 
assess a person’s overall cognitive functioning; it has been continually used 
in courts as well.157  Between adaptive functioning and IQ level, the 
cognitive IQ tends to be the more stable of the two.158  However, some 
believe the IQ score should not be the sole measure used to determine mental 
retardation, and thus may not be suited for a legal use.159 
3. Adaptive Functioning 
Criterion B describes a more subjective way of assessing the 
intellectual functioning of an individual by means of their adaptive 
functioning.160  This element, also referred to as adaptive behavior, includes 
the mental health professional’s assessment of how much service or support 
that a mentally retarded person needs.161  These limitations would affect the 
individual’s daily life as well as any stressors in his or her daily life or 
immediate environment.162  This measure is looking to “assess deficits in the 
performance of adaptive behavioral skills, even more than in the acquisition 
of such skills.”163  The reason that this measure is so subjective is that mental 
health professionals must rely upon interviews and other information 
collected from third parties to make their assessment.164  Other records, such 
as those from school, medical professionals, employment, etc., are also 
consulted, but those are also the result of a third party’s opinion or 
interpretation.165  In addition, over two hundred instruments are available to 
be used as a standardized assessment of adaptive behavior, but these 
assessments face the same level of scrutiny as IQ assessments; the large 
number of available tests shows the level of uncertainty as to what exactly is 
to be tested to make the determination.166  Overall, this assessment is 
                                            
156. Id. at 246–47. 
157. See Gresham, supra note 122, at 93. 
158. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-IV-TR, supra note 5, at 42. 
159. See Rumley, supra note 128, at 1333; Sharp, supra note 49, at 243. 
160. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-IV-TR, supra note 5, at 41–42; see also 
Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 2, at 849; White, supra note 130, at 699. 
161. White, supra note 130, at 699. 
162. Id. at 700. 
163. Tobolowsky, supra note 103, at 96–97. 
164. White, supra note 130, at 700. 
165. Id. 
166. Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 2, at 846; see White, supra note 130, at 
700. 
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particularly important for individuals with mild mental retardation, as it may 
be the determining factor in diagnosis when the IQ score is close to 
borderline range.167 
D. The Atkins Decision 
The Court, by making use of a clinical definition of mental 
retardation, “put professional standards of measurement, assessment, and 
diagnosis in the center of Atkins adjudications.”168  The decision in Atkins 
creates law that is highly dependent on psychological determinations.169  
With the use of the clinical definition of mental retardation and psychometric 
measure of IQ score, the Court concluded that the death penalty is not an 
appropriate punishment for a criminal defendant that is mentally retarded.170  
The Court reasoned that the mentally retarded defendant was “categorically 
less culpable than the average criminal.”171  The public consensus from the 
consistency in direction of change shown by the states was also a 
contributing factor to the decision.172  The Court noted that it was “not so 
much the number of these states that is significant, but the consistency of the 
direction of change.”173  While looking at this, the Court found that mentally 
retarded defendants should be punished in some way, but the death sentence 
is not appropriate due to their lower level of personal culpability.174 
The Court also held that execution of a mentally retarded person 
failed to meet either of the two goals of capital punishment, retribution or 
deterrence.175  These societal functions that the death penalty is supposed to 
accomplish are not obtained with mentally retarded defendants.176  The goal 
of retribution cannot be met with those that have mental impairments as they 
are held to have a lower level of culpability.177  Therefore, in order “to ensure 
that only the most deserving of execution are put to death, an exclusion for 
the mentally retarded is appropriate.”178  Deterrence is not met either due to 
                                            
167. Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 2, at 847. 
168. Id. at 825. 
169. Id. at 813. 
170. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002); Dillard, supra note 50, at 
980. 
171. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316; see Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 432–33 
(1980). 
172. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315; Hall, supra note 2, at 370. 
173. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315. 
174. Hagstrom, supra note 26, at 250. 
175. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319–20; Sharp, supra note 49, at 234. 
176. Clark, supra note 7, at 126. 
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178. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319. 
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the fact that the Court has held that a defendant with mental impairment 
cannot make the appropriate connection between his or her impulsive 
conduct—i.e. murder of another person—with the future punishment of 
death due to the imposition of the death penalty.179  The inability to further 
these two goals of the death penalty contributed to the Court’s decision to 
provide a categorical exemption.180 
A final consideration made by the Court was that mentally retarded 
defendants face a higher possibility of wrongful execution.181  By nature of 
their condition, mentally retarded defendants are at a disadvantage when it 
comes to their defense.182  Mentally retarded defendants serve as poor 
witnesses, do not serve as much help to their defense counsel, can get 
confused easily, can appear to feel no remorse, and suffer other seemingly 
negative results of their diminished capacity.183  In addition, mentally 
retarded defendants have a much larger risk of making a false confession 
than defendants with standard intellectual functioning.184  All of these factors 
were considered and contributed to the Court’s decision that mentally 
retarded defendants should belong to a categorical exemption and should not 
face the death penalty.185 
This decision is a unique one, as it expresses a constitutional rule 
that is entirely dependent on a definition and diagnostic criteria from clinical 
psychology.186  In this case, the Court established “a per se rule exempting 
all persons with mental retardation from the death penalty based on diagnosis 
alone.”187  The exemption includes all people with the diagnosis regardless of 
what level of severity they are found to have.188  This makes the important 
question to be answered in these types of cases to be whether or not the 
defendant is mentally retarded; this is something that the Court disagreed on 
how to determine and left this decision to the states.189  The class that will 
prove to be the most difficult to protect and have the most controversy is the 
mildly mentally retarded as they come closest to the normal border range.190  
                                            
179. Dillard, supra note 50, at 971. 
180. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321; Sharp, supra note 49, at 234. 
181. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321; Hagstrom, supra note 26, at 252. 
182. Hagstrom, supra note 26, at 252. 
183. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320–21; Hagstrom, supra note 26, at 252. 
184. Hagstrom, supra note 26, at 252. 
185. Id. 
186. Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 2, at 813. 
187. Id. at 814. 
188. Id. at 823. 
189. Id. at 815–16; Helen Shin, Note, Is the Death of the Death Penalty Near?  
The Impact of Atkins and Roper on the Future of Capital Punishment for Mentally Ill 
Defendants, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 465, 479–80 (2007). 
190. See Gresham, supra note 122, at 92; Tobolowsky, supra note 103, at 88. 
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However, even with this decision, which essentially overrules Penry, the 
death penalty remains an appropriate punishment “for a smaller, more 
culpable class of defendants.”191 
Justice Scalia makes an additional point about the purpose of the 
death penalty in his dissent.192  An additional purpose of the death penalty is 
to eliminate dangerous offenders; by doing this, the future crimes that they 
may commit are effectively prevented.193  It is quite clear that this goal is 
reached by the death penalty, as these offenders would no longer commit any 
crimes.194  This, however, is a purpose that would be properly served 
regardless of how high or low the offender’s IQ score is.195 
1. Determinations Left to the States 
In making its decision, the Court neglected to implement a procedure 
or designate a specific definition to be applied to determine if a defendant is 
mentally retarded.196  By doing this, the Court left state lawmakers and 
officials, and in a way, forensic psychologists or psychiatrists, the task of 
determining how exactly to enact and properly implement their decision.197  
The Court established some guidance by providing two similar definitions in 
the cases that implement the same three main criteria for a diagnosis.198  It 
could also be argued that the Court intended for the states to adopt one, or a 
hybrid form of the two definitions cited in the decision, due to their 
similarities.199  Its main determination was to justify the exemption of 
mentally retarded defendants from the death penalty; the exact way to 
enforce the exemption was not determined.200  Instead, the Court left this task 
up to the states, as it had done in Ford v. Wainwright201 for the determination 
of competency, and it became the task of the states to develop the 
                                            
191. White, supra note 130, at 687; see also Shin, supra note 189, at 481. 
192. Elmore, supra note 45, at 1330. 
193. Id. 
194. Id. 
195. Id. 
196. Dillard, supra note 50, at 969. 
197. Linda Knauss & Joshua Kutinsky, Into the Briar Patch:  Ethical 
Dilemmas Facing Psychologists Following Atkins v. Virginia, 11 WIDENER L. REV. 121, 121 
(2004). 
198. Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 2, at 812–13, 819. 
199. Id. at 818–19. 
200. Dillard, supra note 50, at 979. 
201. 477 U.S. 399 (1986).  “[T]he Eighth Amendment prohibits states from 
carrying out the death penalty on defendants who are insane. . . . However, the Court left it to 
the individual states to determine the definition of competence for execution and the 
procedures they should use to assess whether a prisoner meets the standard [for] insanity.”  
Shin, supra note 189, at 474. 
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appropriate means of enforcement.202  Many states have chosen to use the 
DSM-IV-TR as their guidelines for making the determination of whether or 
not a defendant is mentally retarded.203  If a state were to fail to exclude the 
mentally retarded from facing the death penalty, that state would be in direct 
violation of the Eighth Amendment.204  Despite this, after the decision was 
made, state courts that did not agree with the decision could potentially use 
this freedom from the Court and lack of a uniform standard as a way to evade 
the Atkins decision.205 
The possibility of other complications arose for all states that 
complied; for example, the differences and discrepancies between the states 
allow for the possibility that one individual “could be found [to be] mentally 
retarded in one state, but not . . . another.”206 It depends on the exact 
language that was chosen by the state to be enacted in its legislation to 
determine what constitutes mental retardation.207  Even without giving a 
direct definition for mental retardation, some argue that the Court should 
have advised that the states not place as much weight on IQ test scores as 
they do.208  However, many states seem to agree that the IQ score cutoff is a 
particularly important factor to include in their legislation.209  There are 
significant differences amongst the states; some are strict on the IQ score 
requirement, while others are more vague by only demanding subaverage 
intellectual functioning.210 
In addition to a definition, the Court also left it up to the states to 
determine the specifics of the procedure, including determining who would 
be the fact finder, at which stage the mental functioning of the defendant 
should be assessed, and what the suitable burden of proof would be.211  For 
example, a majority of states with judicial procedures in place have chosen to 
make this determination prior to the start of trial.212  Some states give the 
task of determining mental retardation to a jury, while others give it to a trial 
judge.213  By neglecting to designate a specific definition and procedure to 
                                            
202. Ford, 477 U.S. at 416–17; Dillard, supra note 50, at 978. 
203. Clark, supra note 7, at 137. 
204. White, supra note 130, at 688. 
205. See John H. Blume et al., An Empirical Look at Atkins v. Virginia and Its 
Application in Capital Cases, 76 TENN. L. REV. 625, 626 (2009). 
206. Hagstrom, supra note 26, at 260. 
207. See id. 
208. Id. at 262–63, 265. 
209. Id. at 265. 
210. Paul S. Appelbaum, Mental Retardation and the Death Penalty:  After 
Atkins, 60 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 1295, 1296 (2009). 
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follow, the Court allows for considerable differences to exist from state to 
state.214  These inconsistencies and differences in procedure and definition 
could cause contradictory rulings on whether or not a defendant has mental 
retardation.215 
2. Other Issues in Applying the Decision 
Several other points of ambiguity and perplexity came to light with 
the Atkins decision, such as the fact that the Court created a categorical 
exemption in the Atkins case.216  The use of this general categorization of 
exemption for those with mental retardation eliminates the entire idea of 
individual sentencing in our legal system as far as this specific group of 
individuals is concerned; it separates those with mental retardation from 
everyone else.217  Beyond the separation between those with normal 
cognitive functioning and those with impairments, the categorization treats 
all those with mental retardation the same without any sort of distinction 
made for the varying degrees of mental retardation.218  This creates a level of 
equality amongst those with the disorder while diagnosis makes a 
differentiation.219 
In neglecting to provide a uniform standard for mental retardation, 
there is also an issue with IQ assessment.220  Multiple assessment tools exist 
to make an assessment, but each has their own set of norms.221  The lack of 
uniform testing requirements may be highly problematic.222  Without a set 
rule as to which test to use, psychologists must be ethical in their 
determination of which test to administer; they must administer a current 
edition of an assessment that they have the appropriate level of proficiency to 
administer.223  The presence of a uniform rule as to which test to use would 
eliminate some of the possible errors and ethical violations that can 
potentially occur.224  The uniform rule would have to be updated frequently 
as these tests are often revised and the courts would have to use a current 
test.225  However, on the other side, the benefits of uniformity could be 
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outweighed by other disadvantages such as individualized selection for the 
defendant and that the clinician should administer the test they feel most 
competent using.226 
Another important point is potential ethical dilemmas that will be 
faced by the mental health professionals who will be assessing the specific 
defendant.227  One of the main issues that will be faced by any forensic 
psychologist is that they have the potential to do harm to their client; 
psychologists, under their ethics code, are not to do any harm to their 
clients.228  Additionally, these psychologists must be sure to go into their 
assessment of the defendant without any sort of preconceived thoughts about 
the crime on trial or what the outcome should be.229  Psychologists have to be 
mindful of any possible factor that may cause an unfair or incorrect result on 
the IQ assessment and properly account for these potential issues in their 
determination and assessment.230  The psychologists in these cases are faced 
with several potential ethical issues that they must avoid while trying to 
generate the most honest and truthful assessment that they can.231 
3. Cases Since Atkins 
In the time since the Atkins decision, many courts have encountered 
cases with mentally retarded defendants.232  However, the floodgates did not 
open for this type of litigation as was feared in the dissent by Justice Scalia; 
there has not been a complete overflow of claims by criminal offenders 
claiming to have mental retardation.233  Research shows that of the claims 
made that have lost, most failed to prove either subaverage intellectual 
functioning or significant limitations in adaptive functioning.234  Data also 
shows that the Atkins decision has not been applied to the states in a uniform 
way as could be expected from the differing legislation created by each 
state.235 
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In regard to intellectual functioning, or analysis of the IQ score, prior 
clinical research suggests that this should be only “a gateway to a rigorous 
assessment of adaptive functioning.”236  This is because it is believed that the 
employment of a strict cut-off of a score of seventy may wrongly exclude 
those who deserve protection under Atkins.237  In an analysis of multiple 
jurisdictions with various IQ cutoff points, it was found that over sixty 
percent of those who successfully prove intellectual impairment had no 
reported IQ scores over the score of seventy; it is also noted that fifteen 
percent of defendants that have been successful with their Atkins claim have 
had IQ scores that exceed seventy.238  A small number of successful Atkins 
claims involve defendants that have never scored below a seventy on any 
intellectual assessment.239  However, there have also been cases with less 
success that focus on IQ score; one example is a case in Texas, where a 
defendant met the requirement of having an IQ below seventy, but was not 
exempted from capital punishment.240 
There have been almost one hundred cases since the ruling in Atkins 
in which defendants with death penalty sentences have been reduced when 
the courts found that they met the necessary requirements to prove they were 
mentally retarded.241  This is an impressive statistic considering that between 
1976 and 2002, prior to Atkins, there were at least forty-one defendants 
executed who would have been found to be mentally retarded and could have 
been exempted.242  However, it seems less impressive when it is stated that 
only a quarter of the inmates that have claimed to be mentally retarded have 
received a stay of execution since the Atkins holding.243  Data shows that 
there have been varying levels of success for proving adaptive deficits; 
depending on which skill set was chosen as the definition for mental 
retardation, which includes several.244  There have also been very few cases 
that lose solely on the third prong, which requires onset before the age of 
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eighteen.245  Together, these results show the inconsistency of the 
implementation of Atkins.246 
III. THE DSM-5 
The latest edition of the Manual was released in late May of 2013.247  
This edition has been a work in progress for fourteen years as its 
development began immediately following the release of DSM-IV.248  DSM-
5 was developed in hope of addressing concerns that had existed with the 
prior editions.249  It was also created in order to match up more closely with 
the World Health Organization (“WHO”) and their International 
Classification of Diseases (“ICD”) as well as other important leading health 
organizations; this will provide for more uniform diagnoses in the health 
system.250  The newest edition of the Manual features several differences 
compared to prior editions, such as a different organizational layout and a 
removal of the prior multi-axial system.251  In this edition, all mental 
disorders are considered to be on a single axis and are therefore, given equal 
weight; prior editions had five axes of unequal weight.252  It is also the first 
edition not to make use of traditional Roman Numerals because this edition 
is intended to be a living document.253  The believed explanation for this 
change to Arabic Numeration is that when new evidence surfaces or changes 
occur, the Manual can be changed online which will produce constant 
revisions, which will produce more editions labeled with a decimal.254  That 
is the hypothesis as to why the decision was made to use the regular 
numerical display for this edition.255  Each change and revision was made 
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carefully to improve the Manual and provide more effective treatment and 
services.256 
A. Intellectual Disability (Intellectual Developmental Disorder) 
The American Psychiatric Association states that “[t]he significant 
changes [to intellectual disability] address what the disorder is called, its 
impact on a person’s functioning, and criteria improvements to encourage 
more comprehensive patient assessment.”257  In DSM-5, the first and most 
noticeable difference to mental retardation is the name change; mental 
retardation is now referred to as intellectual disability (intellectual 
developmental disorder).258  “[T]he parenthetical name . . . is included in the 
text to reflect deficits in cognitive capacity beginning in the developmental 
period.”259  This change occurred for reasons including “policy, 
administrative, and legislative purposes.”260  The new terms were carefully 
selected to be widely used and understood261 as of when this name was 
determined.262  The phrase intellectual disability is one that is commonly 
used in the medical, educational, and other professional fields.263  This name 
change will allow for a more universal understanding of what exactly the 
disability is.264 
In addition to the name change, the fifth edition emphasizes adaptive 
functioning of the individual as opposed to the more heavy reliance on the IQ 
score that is seen in DSM-IV-TR.265 
DSM-5 emphasizes the need to use both clinical assessment and 
standardized testing of intelligence when diagnosing intellectual 
disability, with the severity of impairment based on adaptive 
functioning rather than IQ test scores alone.  By removing IQ test 
scores from the diagnostic criteria, but still including them in the 
text description of intellectual disability, DSM-5 ensures that they 
are not overemphasized as the defining factor of a person’s overall 
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ability, without adequately considering functioning levels.  This is 
especially important in forensic cases.266 
Furthermore, the specification that the disability must be present 
prior to the age of eighteen is removed and replaced with a more generalized 
categorization of beginning in the developmental stage.267  This edition does 
have some consistency with the prior edition as it states that the prevalence 
rate of intellectual disability remains at one percent of the population268 and 
still makes use of the four specifications for the degrees of intellectual 
disability:  Mild, moderate, severe, and profound.269  However, these degrees 
of severity are now “defined on the basis of adaptive function[], and not IQ 
scores” as it is the level of adaptive functioning that determines the level of 
support that will be required for each level of severity.270 
1. Diagnostic Features 
DSM-5 defines intellectual disability as “a disorder with onset 
during the developmental period that includes both intellectual and adaptive 
functioning deficits in conceptual, social, and practical domains.”271  In order 
to receive this diagnosis, there are three criteria that must be met by the 
individual, which was also true in the prior edition.272  In this edition, the 
diagnostic features of intellectual disability are: 
The essential features of intellectual disability 
(intellectual developmental disorder) are deficits in general mental 
abilities (Criterion A) and impairment in everyday adaptive 
functioning, in comparison to an individual’s age-, gender-, and 
socioculturally matched peers (Criterion B).  Onset is during the 
developmental period (Criterion C).  The diagnosis of intellectual 
disability is based on both clinical assessment and standardized 
testing of intellectual and adaptive functions.273 
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In regard to Criterion A, this refers to intellectual functioning.274  To 
meet this, there must be “[d]eficits in intellectual functions . . . confirmed 
both by clinical assessment and individualized, standardized intelligence 
testing.”275  This includes things such as abstract thinking, practical 
understanding, planning, and problem solving.276  IQ scores are used to 
determine part of this and are only approximations of the individual’s 
intellectual functioning.277  Clinical judgment should always be used when 
interpreting the results of an IQ assessment to determine the level of 
intellectual function.278 
Criterion B assesses “[d]eficits in adaptive functioning that result in 
[the] failure to meet developmental and sociocultural standards for personal 
independence and social responsibility.”279  Adaptive functioning is assessed 
in two ways; it is done with both clinical evaluations as well as with the use 
of individualized psychometric measures.280  “Without ongoing support, the 
adaptive deficits limit functioning in one or more activities of daily life . . . 
.”281  There are three domains that are assessed by this criterion:  Conceptual, 
social, and practical.282 
The conceptual—academic—domain involves competence in 
memory, language, reading, writing, math reasoning, acquisition 
of practical knowledge, problem solving, and judgment in novel 
situations, among others.  The social domain involves awareness 
of others’ thoughts, feelings, and experiences; empathy; 
interpersonal communication skills; friendship abilities; and social 
judgment, among others.  The practical domain involves learning 
and self-management across life settings, including personal care, 
job responsibilities, money management, recreation, self-
management of behavior, and school and work task organization, 
among others.283 
This criterion is met when at least one of the domains of adaptive functioning 
is sufficiently impaired.284  Sufficient impairment is when the person needs 
continual support in order to perform that function adequately in at least one 
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life setting.285  Additionally, these adaptive functioning deficits must be 
directly related to the intellectual deficit assessed for Criterion A.286 
The final necessity, Criterion C, is that “[o]nset of intellectual and 
adaptive deficits [is] during the developmental period.”287  Specifically, the 
phrase developmental period refers to either childhood or adolescence; there 
is no specific numerical age assigned to this period of time.288  The removal 
of the cut-off age of eighteen is a significant change as this new term allows 
for more subjective discretion.289  The DSM-5 states that the time of onset 
may vary from person to person as it is dependent upon the specific and 
individualized level of brain dysfunction.290  In order to make a proper 
diagnosis, Criterion C, as well as both Criterion A and B, must be met by the 
individual either within their specific history or past presentations or their 
current presentation; in other words, all three must be met in order for an 
individual to receive this diagnosis.291  The intended purpose of all of these 
revisions was to “help clinicians develop a fuller, more accurate picture of 
patients, a critical step in providing them with” treatment personally tailored 
to each specific individual which will make it as effective as possible.292 
B. Cautionary Statement for Forensic Use 
In its first few pages, the DSM-5 offers a cautionary statement 
towards its use in forensic settings;293 this warning receives much more 
emphasis compared to prior editions as it receives its own full page and 
separate heading.294  It warns that it has been designed to assist mental health 
clinicians in their work such as with assessments, diagnosis of patients, and 
treatment plans.295  The warning stresses that the definition in this edition 
was not developed to meet the needs of legal professionals.296  However, the 
statement also states that if used appropriately, the DSM-5 can serve as a 
useful tool to assist those in the legal profession to make necessary decisions 
by providing the necessary information for a legal decision maker to 
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understand the specific characteristics of a certain mental disorder.297  An 
important point, particularly when assessing mental retardation, is that the 
DSM-5 provides “diagnostic information about the longitudinal course 
[which] may improve decision making when the legal issue concerns [the] 
individual’s mental functioning at a past or future point in time.”298 
However, as with prior editions, this edition does stress that the 
information within its pages poses a risk for misuse or misunderstanding.299  
It is noted that there is an imperfect fit between the DSM-5 information for a 
clinical diagnosis and “the questions of ultimate concern to the law.”300  It 
also stresses the importance of only trained, mental health professionals 
using the Manual for the diagnosis of mental disorders.301  Finally, the 
warning concludes that while the DSM-5 could be a helpful tool in the legal 
field when used appropriately, it is important to note that the meeting of all 
criteria for a certain disorder does not demonstrate the person’s behavior in 
the particular moment in question.302 
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THESE CHANGES 
As the DSM-5 has just been released, the direct result of the changes 
remains to be seen, but it is inevitable that there will be ramifications 
regarding the nation’s categorical ban of defendants with intellectual 
disability from the death penalty.303  The now outdated DSM-IV-TR was 
used as a guideline for many states when they created their legislation 
regarding capital punishment for offenders with intellectual disability.304  As 
mental retardation was revised to intellectual disability and the diagnostic 
criteria has been revised, discrepancies and issues are likely to surface over 
time in regard to the exact definition of intellectual disability for diagnosis.305  
It will be important to deal with any issues quickly as this determination 
could mean the difference between life and death for criminal defendants.306  
The issues that will arise will be the direct result of the varying procedures 
and definitions implemented by the each state’s legislation at the result of the 
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Atkins case and definition and diagnostic criteria for the psychological field 
in the DSM-5.307  The importance and use of the DSM in fields outside of 
psychology is often overlooked, as are the implications of revisions made to 
the Manual.308 
The IQ score is highly emphasized in many state definitions, but has 
been removed from the diagnostic criteria in the DSM-5.309  It can easily be 
understood why it is hypothesized that this will cause confusion; a defendant 
may meet the criterion for intellectual disability by an expert witness, but 
may not meet the legislative standards for that state.310  The removal of the 
focus on the objective assessment of an IQ score will inevitably cause 
trouble in the courtroom as it “has traditionally been at the core of 
diagnosing” intellectual disability.311  The focus for judges, attorneys, and 
psychologists tends to remain on the IQ score.312  Even with the possible 
negative effects, such as the Flynn Effect, the IQ score earned an important 
spot in many state definitions.313  Variation did exist in the exact cut-off IQ 
score used by states.314  For example, several states require an IQ below 
sixty-five while others chose the traditional cut-off of seventy; however, 
there are also states that chose not to identify a minimum IQ score in their 
legislation.315  While it has been established that there are discrepancies 
amongst the states as to how they define and implement their post-Atkins 
procedures, regardless of their current system, problems are likely to arise.316  
Most states modeled their current laws off of the clinical definition in the 
DSM-IV-TR, that was current at the time of the Atkins decision, and made a 
focus on the IQ score.317  With the revisions made to DSM-5, it is inevitable 
that there are now differences between the state’s legal and new clinical 
definition of intellectual disability.318  This will become problematic when 
discrepancies exist between a diagnosis made by a testifying clinical forensic 
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psychologist who focuses on adaptive behavior, but the state court is looking 
for an IQ score to make their determination.319 
The focus now, according to DSM-5, is more on adaptive 
functioning.320  According to DSM-5, this is a positive change as the IQ 
scores became less valid on the lower end of the range where mild 
intellectual disability is located.321  A focus on IQ has also been found to lead 
to problematic outcomes in forensic settings.322  “IQ scores are too unreliable 
and too sensitive to external factors for courts to rely on when a person’s life 
is at stake.”323  Additionally, the new edition of the Manual states that IQ 
scores are only approximations of a person’s intellectual functioning and 
may not be sufficient enough to assess their functioning in real life 
situations.324  However, as mentioned, most states put emphasis on the IQ 
score in their legislation—which is no longer relevant for diagnosis—and 
less concentration on adaptive behavior.325 
Another problematic function of this shift is that adaptive 
functioning is almost entirely based on third party accounts; while 
assessments do exist, that is not the type of behavior that is easily assessed 
with standardized testing.326  When it comes to adaptive behavior, there is 
more difficulty in measurement and presentation of conclusive evidence to 
the fact finder in court.327  Therefore, even as the need for clinical judgment 
in the diagnosis has always been significant, the role of the psychologists 
will become even more important.328  Their clinical judgment will be relied 
upon even further for the subjective assessment of adaptive behavior.329 
Even though it may seem minor, the change of the onset from age 
eighteen to during the developmental period is also a cause for concern.330  
This diagnostic factor was in place to help clinicians rule out other possible 
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diagnoses—such as brain injury—that can occur later in life.331  In the 
alternative, it could provide protection for younger defendants who never 
took an intellectual assessment when they were below the age of eighteen.332  
While before the age of eighteen and during the developmental period are 
intended to refer to the same time frame, the lack of a solid age cut-off may 
allow more room for malingering.333  The age-of-onset criterion served as a 
safeguard to keep a defendant from being able to feign an intellectual 
disability, but with a less restrictive terminology now in place, this safeguard 
may not be as strong.334 
So, why is this important?  Changes and complications are in store 
for the legislation that requires use of the DSM, particularly Atkins cases.335  
The exact result will be dependent on the state in which the trial is 
occurring.336  The reasons for that are the varying definitions and procedures 
in place in each state for dealing with capital punishment and intellectually 
disabled criminal offenders.337  However, despite these differences, a strong 
fear has developed among defense attorneys, as their hypothesis is that this 
new edition will allow for more executions of those that Atkins sought to 
protect.338 
Death penalty lawyers fear that this revision will allow courts to 
execute offenders with IQ scores below seventy more easily.339  Arguably, 
this shift in focus can give states more room to subvert the decision made in 
Atkins and allow the execution of a mentally retarded defendant in the mild 
range.340  The determination of adaptive functioning is exceptionally more 
subjective than an IQ score, which will undoubtedly allow for each side to 
have an expert witness arguing the alternative opinions on the diagnosis.341  
By replacing a diagnosis that requires one objective part and one subjective 
part with a fully subjective assessment, it gives courts more room to avoid 
following the Atkins decision if they so choose.342  Research has found that 
jurors have stereotypes of how they believe intellectual disability should 
manifest.343  If a jury is the fact finder, it is more likely for a person with 
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mild mental retardation to be executed, as they are unlikely to meet the 
standards of the stereotype; the jury may not accept the subjective 
assessment by a psychological expert witness because they will realize there 
is room for interpretation in the diagnosis.344  If the decision is for a judge to 
make and the defendant falls into a gray area for diagnosis based on their 
level of adaptive behavior, the judge has room to interpret the facts and use 
his or her own discretion to make a decision;345 this is a cause for concern as 
judges are not trained in this field.346  Defendants with IQ scores lower than 
seventy have been executed in the past several years despite the Atkins 
decision, and the DSM revision is highly likely to make this worse with the 
change to more subjective diagnostic criterion.347 
With a focus on adaptive function, this could lead to more 
executions of those the Atkins holding was intended to protect.348  It is 
believed that the removal of adaptive behavior from the requirements could 
actually bar more executions than required by the Atkins decision.349  A focus 
on this requirement of adaptive functioning allows for more erroneous 
findings of intellectual disability.350  With adaptive function, the focus is 
always on the weaknesses and never the strengths.351  If the focus were to 
return to the IQ score, the reach of Atkins exemption could arguably be 
expanded.352 
The DSM work group defends their decision and states that they do 
not agree with the fear of the defense attorneys.353  The American Psychiatric 
Association is a large organization that represents thousands of psychiatric 
professionals; its goal is for them to all work together and create the best 
mental heath care possible.354  Additionally, the prior focus on IQ scores is 
more likely to result in a mentally retarded defendant facing the death 
penalty due to its inherent limitations.355  A single IQ point could be the 
difference between life and death for an offender if additional clinical 
interpretation and analysis is not considered.356  For example, in a stricter 
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cut-off state, such as Kentucky, a defendant must have an IQ score of 
seventy or lower in order to be considered to have an intellectual 
disability.357  An IQ score does not allow a legal fact finder to see the whole 
picture of who the defendant is and why they did what they did, but it does 
give them a numerical value as a comparison to assess their intellectual 
function, which makes their execution more likely.358  The DSM work group 
believes that their revision should be helpful to the courts by shifting the 
attention to adaptive behavior; this way, the courts can analyze the defendant 
more thoroughly and make more accurate decisions about the defendant’s 
mental abilities.359 
If the DSM does have a negative impact and results in the death of 
more mentally retarded defendants, this is a violation of the protection 
ensured to mentally retarded offenders by the Atkins decision.360  That 
holding was intended to protect them from cruel and unusual punishment.361  
In the Atkins holding, the Supreme Court of the United States intended to 
provide a categorical protection to those with intellectual disability by 
providing exemption from the death penalty that is now challenged by the 
changing diagnostic criteria of intellectual disability.362  With this new 
update to the diagnostic criteria of intellectual disability and the already 
existing discrepancies amongst the states, confusion is inevitable and the 
need for a uniform definition is even clearer.363 
A. Possible Solutions 
In cases where the court is unclear as to whether or not a defendant 
has an intellectual disability, the court should revisit the deciding factors in 
the Atkins holding.364  The court should consider the goals of capital 
punishment—deterrence and retribution—and whether they will in fact be 
furthered by the death of the defendant.365  In the end, “the court[] must 
conclude both that the defendant was more morally culpable than the average 
criminal and that the rationale behind the death penalty applies” 
appropriately to justify the most severe punishment in the country.366  In 
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addition, the states may just want to consider revising their legislation to 
include the updated diagnostic criteria.367  Each state still has the ability to 
determine the definition used to make their legislation to categorically 
exempt intellectually disabled defendants.368  By making a revision, the court 
can be assured that they will properly determine if the death penalty is 
appropriate when faced with an Atkins case.369  Going back to the original 
decision may help courts make a more appropriate decision.370 
Another seemingly simple solution, however, would be to implement 
a uniform national standard.371  A countrywide standard would eliminate the 
state-to-state discrepancies.372  The new standard should be made in 
accordance with the current psychological definition and diagnostic criteria 
in the DSM-5 as well as the Atkins decision.373  In addition to eliminating the 
confusion created by having multiple definitions, the standard should also 
include procedural information such as when this determination should be 
made, as well as whether the judge, jury, or both should make it.374  This 
would prevent the possibility of different holdings for the same person 
depending on which state their trial was held in.375  By embracing the new 
edition of the DSM and finally creating a uniform way to enforce the Atkins 
holding, those that the Atkins decision intended to protect are more likely to 
be spared from execution.376 
V. CONCLUSION 
In 2002, the Supreme Court of the United States made a 
groundbreaking decision in Atkins v. Virginia and their decision created a 
categorical exemption for mentally retarded offenders.377  However, their 
lack of a uniform standard or specific guidance for the states regarding a 
definition of mental retardation led the states to make their own decision 
regarding legislation.378  Many states relied upon the DSM-IV-TR definition 
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